Changing patterns of maternal employment, coupled with stronger work requirements for welfare recipients, are increasing the demand for child care. For many families, the cost of child care creates a financial burden; for mothers with low incomes and those who are former welfare recipients, these costs may be an insurmountable barrier to employment or economic self-sufficiency. Despite increased public spending in this area, the receipt of any child care subsidy appears to be a relatively rare and uncertain event. In this study, we use data from a sample of low-income single mothers (current and recent welfare recipients in California) to estimate the probability of their receiving child care subsidies and the effect of this probability on labor market activity.
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In response to the need for more and more affordable child care, both the federal and state governments have increased spending on child care subsidies. Despite these increases, the receipt of child care subsidies remains a rare event for low-income mothers. Several prior studies have estimated the likely effect of a reduction in child care costs on maternal labor supply. Yet few researchers have considered the antecedent question of how the chances of receiving child care subsidies affect mothers' labor market activities. Given low rates of subsidy receipt, the answer to this question may be as important as are estimates of mothers' labor-supply responses to child care costs or subsidy levels.
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BACKGROUND

Maternal Employment and Child Care Costs
Maternal employment has risen steeply in recent decades, with the sharpest growth among those with children under age 6. Although employment has become much more common among both married and single mothers, women with young children continue to work less than do men or women with fewer caregiving responsibilities. The causes of these mothers' lower participation in the labor market are multiple and interacting. The evidence is unambiguous, however, that having young children in the home reduces both the probability that women will be employed and, among those who are employed, their hours of paid work (Connelly 1991; Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger 1988) . By one estimate, as of 1998 living with a child under age 6 depressed the employment of both single and married mothers in the United States by about 500 hours annually (Cohen and Bianchi 1999) .
The gap in labor force participation between mothers and nonmothers can be traced, at least in part, to the cost of child care. Considerable empirical research has confirmed the prediction that higher costs for child care are associated with lower labor force participation among mothers with young children and, among those who do work, fewer hours of employment (Blau and Robins 1991; Connelly 1991 Connelly , 1992 Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992; Leibowitz et al. 1988; Ribar 1992; Stolzenberg and Waite 1984) . The labor supply of low-income, low-skilled, and single mothers is particularly sensitive to child care costs (Anderson and Levine 1998; Han and Waldfogel 1998; Kimmel 1995; Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992) .
Concern that child care costs create a barrier to employment-particularly for single mothers and low-skilled workers, who are the most likely to depend on welfare-has spurred a considerable increase in public funding for child care assistance. Since the mid-1980s, the federal and state governments have increased funding for welfare-linked child care subsidies, for working-poor families, and for early childhood education and prekindergarten services. The 1996 welfare reform bill, which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the new Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, increased federal child care funding substantially. The law also combined several categorical federal programs into an expanded Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and authorized further child care investments by allowing states to transfer funds between the TANF and CCDF block grants.
Although child care funding has grown, the availability of subsidized arrangements remains limited. Data from the early to mid-1990s, prior to the 1996 federal welfare reforms, suggested that relatively few mothers received child care subsidies (Hofferth 1995; Kimmel 1998; Long and Clark 1997; Meyers and Heintze 1999; U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO] 1997) . Several studies that have been conducted since the 1996 federal welfare reforms have suggested that the receipt of subsidies remains low and highly variable by state. A review of 15 state-level studies of welfare "exiters" found that in 14 of the 15 states, subsidies were received by 35% or fewer of employed welfare exiters; in 6 of the 15, subsidy rates were 20% or lower (Schumacher and Greenberg 1999) . These findings are consistent with those of a study by the U.S. GAO (1999) , which estimated that states are serving only 10% to 15% of potentially eligible recipients of the CCDF program.
Estimates of the impact of a decrease in child care costs predict substantial increases in maternal employment, with the impact concentrated among women who face the steepest financial barriers to work (Anderson and Levine 1998; Han and Waldfogel 1998; Kimmel 1995; Michalopoulos et al. 1992; U.S. GAO 1994) . Although these simulations have addressed the impacts of lower child care costs, they have not examined the questions of which families receive subsidies and how the chances of receiving subsidies affect employment outcomes. Given the uncertainty regarding their receipt, child care subsidies may be an all-or-nothing form of assistance for low-income women. If so, simulations in which subsidies raise or lower the effective price of child care for all women are likely to miss the effect of uncertain receipt on women's employment decisions. In doing so, they are likely to overstate the potential effectiveness of subsidies-for reducing family child care costs and increasing maternal employment-by assuming that all low-income users of child care benefit equally from the expansion of subsidies.
Research on employment and the actual receipt of subsidies has been limited, in part, by the lack of appropriate data. Blau's (2000) review article mentioned only two other such studies. Gelbach (1999) estimated the impact on mothers' employment of the availability of free kindergarten, which is equivalent to a 100% price subsidy, and found a substantial positive impact. Berger and Black (1992) also found a substantial impact on employment in a comparison of low-income single mothers in Kentucky who received child care subsidies with otherwise similar women who were on waiting lists. It is interesting that the authors also found that although the receipt of a subsidy increases the probability of employment, it does not affect the hours of work among those who are employed. Berger and Black's (1992) research reinforces our speculation that child care subsidies have a "threshold" effect on employment related to the chances of being subsidized, as well as a net-price effect among those who are subsidized. Although our data did not permit us to investigate the effects of subsidies on effective child care costs, we developed a model in which both the chances of being subsidized and the effects of those chances on employment are determined. We attempted to extend the work of researchers such as Berger and Black (1992) by using broader measures of child care and the use of subsidies; expanding the analysis to include potential users of child care and child care subsidies; and considering a different context, namely, several counties in California.
Policy Context
In 1995, when the data for this analysis were collected, the public child care system in California was large and complex. Assistance was provided through a variety of mechanisms, including direct services (e.g., public preschool programs), vendor agreements with nonprofit centers, and vouchers and income disregards that reimbursed families for the purchase of private care. In most of the voucher and reimbursement programs, parents were able to obtain assistance for either market forms of care (e.g., in centers, preschools, family day care homes, or after-school programs) or for informal baby-sitting by friends and relatives.
A low-income family with a child under age 14 might have been eligible for one of at least seven different subsidies, broadly targeted to education and training support for adults, adult employment, or early childhood education. Most of these subsidies represented an all-or-nothing outcome for parents. Several forms of subsidized care were provided with no copayments; others imposed a relatively modest, income-adjusted copayment. Most subsidized care was also rationed, however. Some forms of assistance were rationed explicitly through, for example, waiting lists for early childhood education services and employment-support programs. Other forms of assistance were implicitly rationed through burdensome application procedures and administrative practices that controlled access to activities-such as job-preparation activities-that qualified parents for subsidies.
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
A large body of research suggests that child care subsidies should generate an increase in maternal employment. The receipt of a subsidy appears to be a relatively rare and uncertain event, however, even for low-income mothers who appear to be the targets of the recent expansion of child care subsidies. Yet few researchers have investigated the fac-tors that influence whether a mother receives a subsidy and the consequences of that subsidy with respect to employment outcomes.
In this study, we used data from a sample of low-income single mothers, all of whom were current and recent welfare recipients in California, to address two questions: (1) what are the chances that these mothers would receive child care subsidies if they were to use child care, and (2) how would variations in the likelihood of being subsidized affect these mothers' labor market activities?
Our model had two key endogenous variables, labor market activity and expected receipt of a subsidy conditional on the use of child care. Given the conditional (and presumably selective) nature of subsidization, we estimated a third equation for child care usage. Of particular interest is the effect of subsidization on labor market activity.
Appealing to standard economic theories of labor supply (e.g., Killingsworth 1983), the equation for labor market activity includes as covariates variables related to the market wage (such as educational attainment and prior participation in job-preparation activities); to the value of time spent in nonmarket labor, including child care (such as the number, ages, and health status of children); and to other factors associated with opportunities and relative preferences for time spent in market or nonmarket activities (such as race, ethnicity, and nativity).
In formulating an auxiliary equation for the receipt of subsidies, we included variables that reflect both demand and supply factors. On the demand side, the receipt of child care subsidies is expected to increase with the potential cost of nonmaternal care. The most important factor in cost is the amount of child care used, which is determined by the mother's activities: the more she is occupied with work or training activities, the more hours of care her children will require. Demand is therefore likely to be greater among women who have higher human capital and potential for employment. Women with younger children also are expected to have greater and potentially more expensive care needs and thus higher demands for subsidies. Other studies have found that mothers' tastes for alternative care arrangements vary with education, ethnicity, and immigration status. In general, studies have suggested that more poorly educated, immigrant mothers are less likely to put their children in substitute care than are more highly educated and native-born mothers. When they do use nonmaternal care, these women are more likely to rely on close family members and friends who may provide less costly care (Fuller, Holloway, and Liang 1996; Lehrer 1983; Leibowitz et al. 1988; Mason and Kuhlthau 1992) . We therefore anticipated that mothers with more education and those born in the United States will be more likely to seek child care subsidies. An additional demand factor is the women's ability to negotiate the child care and welfare bureaucracies. Given the complexity of the system and the difficulty of obtaining subsidies, we argue that women who know more about the AFDC system and rules and who are more familiar with specific child care subsidies will be more assertive in seeking and more successful in obtaining child care subsidies.
On the supply side, the most important factor is the relative availability of subsidies from various public sources. In the mid-1990s, the level of subsidy resources was not highly variable across localities within California. However, substantial waiting lists during this period suggest that the supply of subsidies fell short of the demand for them. As a result, effective supply reflected bureaucratic policies and practices used to allocate scarce benefits. Unlike overall resources, these bureaucratic practices were highly variable by location. We would therefore expect the probability of receipt to differ for women in different California counties. Bureaucratic rationing was also affected by policies that set service priorities, particularly the provisions of the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA) that required the states to enroll a proportion of all AFDC recipients in work or work-preparation activities. Local welfare offices routinely gave priority in awarding child care subsidies to recipients who could be enrolled in these activities, particularly those who were members of the four groups of welfare recipients targeted by the act. Mothers falling into one of these groups are likely to have higher probabilities of receiving subsidies. 1
ESTIMATION
We used a two-stage model to analyze the effect of child care subsidies on labor market activity. In the first stage, we modeled the receipt of subsidies conditional on child care usage. Using results from the first-stage model, we calculated the probability that each mother in the sample would be subsidized if she were to use child care and estimated, in a second-stage model, the effect of that probability on a mother's labor market activity. We used data from a two-wave panel survey of low-income families who were in or exiting from California's welfare system. Because all families in the sample had at least one child under age 14 and all were current or recent welfare recipients, all were assumed to have been eligible for at least one of the subsidies described earlier.
Our econometric framework consists of a labor market activity equation of the form
where S indicates that a mother's child care arrangement is subsidized (given that some form of nonmaternal child care is used), X 0 is an array of covariates, u 0 is a random disturbance, and α 0 and β 0 are unknown coefficients. A, an observed discrete indicator of labor market activity, equals 1 if the unobserved index A * > 0, and equals zero otherwise. Assuming the u 0 are normally distributed, (1a) is a probit equation. Two problems preclude the direct estimation of (1a). First, S is observed only among mothers who are currently engaged in labor market activity and using child care (a minority of our sample) and therefore are potentially able to have their child care expenses subsidized. The majority of mothers who are not employed (i.e., for whom A = 0) do not use child care. Second, we had to anticipate selectivity bias among women for whom S is observed; that is, the unobserved factors associated with the receipt of a subsidy are likely to be correlated with the unobserved factors associated with the decision to use child care. To address these problems, we attempted to develop a proxy for S by modeling the actual receipt of subsidies among the child care users in our sample.
To address the problems of censored observations and selection bias, we replaced S in (1a) with a predicted value developed in an auxiliary analysis. Thus, we estimated the equation
where π S = Pr[S = 1] = E[S]. The estimated probability of subsidization was calculated using coefficients estimated in the first stage of the analysis, a censored probit (or probit with selection) model (see Greene 1997 ; this type of model was first discussed by Olsen 1992) . In this auxiliary model, the two binary dependent variables are indicators of child care use (C) and of subsidization (S). Although the underlying latent indices C * and S * are viewed as fully jointly determined, the model is censored because S is observed only when C = 1. The unknown parameters of these equations are β C ; the effects of covariates on C, β S , the effects of covariates on S; and ρ, the correlation between the disturbances of the two equations. π S is computed as Φ(X S, β S ), where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution and X S is the array of explanatory variables included in the model.
1. There is evidence that patterns of child care usage are also sensitive to supply factors in the local child care market, such as the availability of various types of care and the stringency of local regulations for the safety and quality of services. Although these contextual factors appear to influence the type of care used, there is little evidence that they influence the probability of using any care or of receiving a subsidy.ˆ To identify the parameters of Eq. (1b), the vector of exogenous variables predicting subsidy receipt (X s ) contains one variable that does not appear in the employment equation. Women's knowledge of the public child care system is assumed to have little or no direct effect on women's employment decision, operating only through the probability of the receipt of subsidies, and is therefore excluded from (1b). Because π S is an erroneous measure of the true probability of being subsidized, we had to anticipate that our estimate of α 1 might be biased toward zero. Also, the standard errors of the second-stage coefficients had to be corrected for sampling error. For this purpose, we calculated the covariance matrix using procedures presented in Murphy and Topel (1985) .
DATA AND VARIABLES
Data
The data were obtained from the AFDC Household Survey, administered to a stratified random sample of California AFDC recipients through a joint effort of the state Department of Social Services and the University of California at Berkeley Data Archive and Technical Assistance Program. Survey respondents were selected in November 1992 from the welfare administrative records of four California counties: Alameda, Los Angeles, San Joaquin, and San Bernardino. These counties represent a mix of rural and urban locations and accounted for half the welfare caseload in California.
The principal woman in the family (in general, the AFDC recipient) was surveyed twice by telephone. A first interview was conducted approximately 18 months after selection with a total of 2,214 households from a sampling frame of 3,824 (a 60% completion rate). The sample was surveyed a second time 18 months later with 1,764 households responding (an 80% retention rate). Nonresponse and sample attrition might have biased our estimates; in particular, we might expect that those families who could not be contacted by telephone had less stable living arrangements or lacked telephone service and were thus more disadvantaged than were those we did contact. The exclusion of more disadvantaged respondents might lead us to overly optimistic conclusions about the labor force participation and child care service use of this population.
All households were receiving AFDC when they were selected in 1992. By the time of the first interviews, approximately 15% had left the AFDC program; at the time of the second interviews, about 25% indicated that they no longer received welfare. The data analyzed in this article were taken from the second wave of interviews. The analysis sample was restricted to single-mother families with at least one child under age 14 (n = 903).
Outcomes
Three outcomes of interest were modeled: labor market activity (A), child care use (C), and receipt of a governmental child care subsidy (S). A woman was considered to be engaged in labor market activity if she reported regular employment in the month before the interview or was participating in job-preparation activities at the time of the interview. 2 Child care use was measured as the use of any nonmaternal care on a regular basis, including that provided as informal baby-sitting by family members, fathers, or friends; in regulated or unregulated family day care; or in centers, preschools, Head Start programs, and the like. We restricted our definition of child care users to include only women who were simultaneously engaged in labor market activity, to ensure that the first-and 2. This construction of the outcome measure is consistent with subsidy policies in place in the mid-1990s when this study was conducted. During this period, subsidies were available for mothers in both employment and job-preparation activities, and federal policy (under the FSA) created incentives for local administrators to channel funds to participants in job-preparation activities. It is also consistent with the behavior of the population under study-welfare recipients and recent exiters-who often cycled between and combined jobpreparation and employment activities.ˆ second-stage analyses would be consistent. Child care use was measured for the youngest child in the family. 3 The receipt of any form of governmental subsidy was determined using a series of questions about payment and subsidy arrangements in the prior month. Mothers who used market forms of care (day care centers, family child care, preschools, or other center care) free of charge or who received assistance from any governmental program to pay for either baby-sitting or market care were coded as receiving subsidies. Care provided without charge by family members and friends and private (family) assistance with the costs of market care were not treated as subsidies. 4
Independent Variables
Measures of current caregiving responsibilities included the total number of resident children under age 18, the presence of young children, and the children's disability status. Because prior studies have found that patterns of maternal employment and child care use vary with children's age group (rather than as a linear function of age), we coded children's ages into indicators of whether the youngest child was an infant between birth and age 3 or a preschooler aged 3 to 5 (with children over age 6 as the excluded category). A mother's tastes for nonmaternal care were captured by education (years of schooling) and a dummy variable indicating whether the mother was born outside the United States. A variable indicating the number of nonparental adults residing with the family was included to capture any aid such adults might have offered to meet child care needs.
Bureaucratic rationing practices were measured by including indicators of the mother's county of residence and membership in FSA target groups. To capture variation in the mothers' ability to navigate the child care system, we included two lagged knowledge scales measured at the first interview (approximately 18 months earlier): a 4-point scale measuring knowledge about AFDC employment-related rules and a 5-point scale measuring more specific knowledge about child care subsidies.
A mother's income in the absence of employment was measured as the maximum AFDC benefit for her family. 5 The mother's expected wage was proxied by her education, age, race/ethnicity, and employment tenure immediately before the first interview. To capture specific barriers and resources that are relevant to the employment of low-income women, we also included two lagged measures of employment supports: whether the woman was participating in any employment-related education or training activities and whether she owned a car. 6 Because the sample was selected using a stratified design, several additional variables were included in all the models to control for possible design effects (the basis of AFDC eligibility when the sample was selected and whether the woman was a participant in the experimental or control group of the Work Pays demonstration project; see California Work Pays Demonstration Project Survey 1997).
3. We did not include child care for other children in the family. Not doing so may have led us to underestimate both the cost of nonsubsidized care and the probability of receiving subsidies. Care for the youngest child, however, is assumed to create the greatest barrier to employment. 4. If a child was in more than one type of care (e.g., in both a child care center and informal baby-sitting), the payment arrangement for the care used the most number of hours was considered.
5. Although labor supply models typically include other nonlabor income, for this sample of single, current and former welfare recipients, maternal earnings and AFDC benefits captured virtually all household income.
6. Our measure of nonlabor income (the maximum AFDC benefit) also captures the number of children in the family because all the members of the sample were from the same state and were thus eligible for the same level of payment, depending on their family size. We expected that both the income effect and the caregiving effect (associated with more children) would affect labor market activities in the same direction.
FINDINGS
Characteristics of the Sample
The sample of single mothers used in this analysis closely resembled women who were in the welfare system when these data were collected in 1995 (see Table 1 for the characteristics of the sample). The average respondent was approximately 33 years old and had two children (not shown). One quarter of the respondents reported that they had a disability or health condition that limited the amount or type of work that they could do, and 22% had one or more children with disabilities or limiting health conditions. The majority (70%) were born in the United States, and the sample was divided among African American (33%), Hispanic (46%), and non-Hispanic white (18%) respondents. The percentage of Hispanic women in the sample was higher than in the AFDC program nation- ally, but the high proportion of Latinas is representative of California's program population (U.S. House of Representatives 1997). In 28% of the sample, the youngest child was under age 3, and in an additional 28%, the youngest child was aged 3 to 5. Again, these proportions differed from those of the national AFDC caseload at the time (in which 24% of the AFDC families contained an infant and 22% contained a preschooler) but are similar to those of the California caseload.
When contacted approximately 36 months after the sample was drawn from the AFDC records, 85% were still receiving AFDC. Although most respondents continued to receive welfare, 27% reported that they had been employed in the prior month in regular jobs, and 51% were either employed or in job-preparation activities (or both). Among the 51% who were either employed or in job-preparation activities in the previous month, 76% had also received welfare.
Child Care Use and the Receipt of Subsidies
The use of nonmaternal child care was relatively high and, as is the case with other populations, the use varied with the age of the child and the mother's activities. As would be expected, the use of child care was higher among mothers who were engaged in out-ofhome activities. Among all the employed mothers, 81% used nonmaternal child care, and among those in either employment or job-preparation activities, 65% did so (see Table 2 ).
In many respects, the respondents were the targets of the recent expansion of public child care subsidies: all were current or recent welfare recipients; all had dependent children; many were making a transition to employment; and, among those engaged in labor market activities, most were using child care on a regular basis. Despite high levels of child care use, few mothers were actually receiving subsidies. Among the mothers who were engaged in either employment or job-preparation activities, 18% were receiving subsidies; among those who were employed, only 13% were. About 14% of these mothers had free care from friends and relatives or other family assistance to help them purchase care. The majority of employed mothers (54%) and one-third of those in either employment or job-preparation activities were paying the full cost of care themselves. When the comparison was restricted to child care users, the percentage who were subsidized was higher: 16.5% and 27.4% of the mothers who used child care and were employed or engaged in job-preparation activities, respectively, were receiving child care subsidies. 
Model of the Receipt of Subsidies
The results of our censored probit model of child care use and subsidies indicates that the correlation between error terms in the two probit equations is both numerically small and statistically no different from zero (β = 0.054; SE = 1.528). Lacking any compelling evidence of selectivity in the subsidy equation, we reestimated the subsidy equation among the sample of child care users (n = 310) using a binary probit model. The results for this binary probit model of conditional subsidy receipt are shown in the first three columns of Table 3 . The pattern of results is consistent with our expectations, although few variables reached statistical significance. Indicators of a greater need for assistance had a generally positive association with the receipt of subsidies. The age of the youngest child was statistically significant: in comparison with mothers with school-aged children, mothers of preschoolers were more likely to receive subsidies. This finding may reflect the structure of public child care programs, which provide substantially more options for preschoolers through public Head Start and early childhood education programs. The coefficient for the number of nonparental adults in the family was negative (although significant at only the .10 level), which would be expected if these adults provided free baby-sitting as an alternative to paid (and potentially subsidized) forms of child care. Women in each of the four counties appeared about equally likely to receive subsidies if they were child care users. The sign on the coefficient for membership in one of the FSA target groups was large and in the expected positive direction, suggesting that local administrators were giving priority to these cases in the allocation of means-tested subsidies.
Model of Employment
The last three columns of Table 3 report the results of the second-stage labor market activity equation. Factors predicting maternal labor market activity performed as hypothesized. The variable for maximum AFDC benefit (given the family size) had a significant, negative coefficient. This finding reflects both the income effect of welfare benefits and, because AFDC benefits increase with the number of resident children, the level of caregiving responsibilities. Most human capital measures had the expected association with the probability of labor market activity. Women who had more recent work experiences and more years of education were significantly more likely to be involved in labor market activities; those with limiting health problems were significantly less likely to do so. Women who had been involved with some form of employment training 18 months earlier were also much more likely to be currently engaged in some form of labor market activity. Greater caregiving responsibilities had the expected negative relationship with labor market activity, although the association was less robust than expected, perhaps because of the inclusion of the proxy for number of children and the predicted receipt of subsidies. In comparison with the women whose children all were over age 6, those with any children under 2 or aged 3 to 5 were less likely to be engaged in labor market activities, although neither indicator reached statistical significance. After we controlled for these factors, the variable of central interest for this analysis-the predicted probability of receiving a subsidy-had a significant and substantial impact on the probability that a mother was engaged in labor market activities in the previous month. As we noted earlier, measurement error in this variable is likely to bias its estimated coefficient toward zero, which gives us additional confidence in the statistical and substantive significance of this finding. 7 To help interpret the magnitude of the subsidy effect, we simulated probabilities of labor market activity for the entire sample, setting other characteristics at their mean values while varying the probability of subsidy receipt from 0 to 60%. The resulting probabilities, shown in Table 4 , can be interpreted as those of a population whose average characteristics are identical to those of the sample but who face varying probabilities of receiving child care subsidies. The results are dramatic. If the likelihood of receiving a subsidy is set to zero, the probability of labor market activity for the sample as a whole is only 21%. At the mean subsidy level for this sample (0.274), about 49% of the women in the sample are predicted to engage in labor market activity (see the last row of Table 4 ). This proportion is almost identical to the observed percentage of sample women in this 7. One referee's comment implied that our estimated coefficient on the predicted probability of subsidy receipt is biased because of the weak correlation between our instrumental variable (knowledge of subsidies) and S (see, for example, Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995) . As Angrist and Krueger (1999) showed, however, this "weak instruments" problem is not present for two-stage estimators in just-identified models such as ours. Furthermore, our partial use of a split-sample technique (i.e., the fact that for two-thirds of our sample the instrument is estimated on a nonoverlapping sample) further guards against bias. Finally, the knowledge-ofsubsidies variable is not only a plausible instrument, it is the only plausible instrumental variable among those included in X s . category (see Table 2 ). This finding supports the assumption, implicit in our modeling approach, that the probability of being subsidized among women not using child care (which is unobserved) is the same, conditional on other observables, as among women who are observed to be using child care. Doubling the likelihood of subsidization from its observed level to 60% increases the predicted rate of labor market activity to over 80%.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Approximately three years after our sample of single, welfare-recipient mothers was selected, just over half the mothers were engaged in employment, job-preparation activities, or both. Among the mothers who were engaged in some form of labor market activity, the majority reported that they had used some form of child care for their youngest child in the previous month. Although these low-income mothers who were making the transition from welfare to work were nominally given top priority for receiving child care subsidies and many seemed to be eligible for assistance, only 13% of those who were employed and 18% of those with any labor market activity were using subsidized child care or receiving subsidies for privately purchased care. As a result, 69% of mothers with labor market activities were using unsubsidized child care that they either paid for out of pocket or obtained without charge from family members. The receipt of a child care subsidy was thus an uncommon event, even for former welfare recipients who were engaged in various forms of labor market activity. When we estimated the probability of receiving a subsidy, accounting for selectivity of subsidy receipt, few characteristics of the family, other than the child's age, were found to differentiate the child care users who received subsidies from those who did not. The most powerful predictor of the receipt of subsidies was the mother's membership in one of the priority groups identified by the 1988 FSA, which governed welfare and some child care policy as of the mid-1990s when these data were collected. This finding suggests that, consistent with the observations of administrative studies, local child care and welfare administrators may have been rationing limited child care benefits to serve high-priority populations.
After we controlled for human capital and family characteristics, we found that the likelihood of receiving subsidies had a large and significant impact on the likelihood that mothers were engaged in some form of labor market activity. Even in the absence of any subsidies, we estimated that as many as 21% of these women would be either working or in job-preparation activities. If 10% were subsidized, we would expect the rate of labor market activity to increase to 30%. If half the women with these characteristics received subsidies, holding other factors constant, we would expect that nearly three-quarters would enter employment or job-preparation activities. Although these estimates seem to suggest that employment could be made a virtual certainty if the chances of subsidization approached 100%, predictions cannot be extended reliably beyond the range we have described. Remember that in our sample, the average chance of being subsidized was under 30%. To raise this chance even to 50% would require nearly a doubling of the resources devoted to child care, a major change in policy. What our estimate does suggest is that child care subsidies may have a "threshold" effect that has not been considered in prior work. Anderson and Levine (1998) , for example, estimated that for a single mother with a child under age 6 and less than a high school education, a 50 cent-per-hour child care subsidy could increase employment from 25% to 33%. This simulation may poorly represent the realities for low-income mothers in the current child care policy environment, however. Rather than all low-income women receiving a small hourly subsidy, a small proportion obtain care that is either fully subsidized or has, at the most, a small copayment, while the remainder absorb the full cost of child care themselves (unless they can arrange free care with family members or friends). Our simulated labor-supply response may be more usefully compared to that of Cackley (U.S. GAO 1994), who estimated that reducing child care costs to zero would lead to a 50% increase in employment among low-income women.
Ours is one of the few studies to provide both direct measures of the rate of child care subsidization and to estimate the role of the receipt of subsidies in low-income single mothers' participation in the labor market. Although provocative, the conclusions from this analysis should be interpreted cautiously for at least two reasons. First, the data represent the experience of single mothers in only one state and before recent reforms in welfare and the expansion of public child care funding. Second, although the response rate was good for a telephone survey with a disadvantaged population, the nonrespondents and those lost to the sample between Waves 1 and 2 may have been less residentially stable and more disadvantaged than those who were surveyed. If this is the case, our findings may be overly optimistic about both labor market activities and the receipt of child care subsidies.
Additional research on these questions is crucial as welfare and child care policies are reformed. The passage of federal welfare reforms in 1996 increased the pressure on low-income mothers to enter the workforce. Rates of employment among low-income mothers, particularly among single mothers, have started to rise. There have also been a number of promising developments in child care policy in recent years. Federal and state governments have increased investments in child care subsidies, and many states have also expanded early education and prekindergarten programs. Despite this expansion, studies of the use of child care subsidies in the post-welfare-reform period suggest that rates of subsidization remain low and highly variable across states. The findings from this study suggest that the failure of the supply of subsidies to keep pace with the need for them may be having two deleterious consequences. Some low-income mothers will go to work without subsidies, absorbing the full cost of child care themselves. And many others may fail to make the transition to employment, with uncertain prospects for their shortand long-term economic welfare.
